Gatherer is the Magic Card Database. Search for the perfect addition to your deck. Browse through cards from Magic's entire history. See cards from the most recent sets and discover what players just like you are saying about them. Delay the delivery of a message While composing a message, select the More options arrow from the Tags group in the Ribbon. Under Delivery options, select the Do not deliver before check box, and then click the delivery date and time you want. Asyncio.ensurefuture (obj,., loop=None) ¶ Return: obj argument as is, if obj is a Future, a Task, or a Future-like object (isfuture is used for the test.). A Task object wrapping obj, if obj is a coroutine (iscoroutine is used for the test); in this case the coroutine will be scheduled by ensurefuture. A Task object that would await on obj, if obj is an awaitable (inspect. Language delays in children have many possible causes. In some instances, more than one factor contributes to a language delay. Some children catch up to their peers and meet future language.
Red Bull team principal Christian Horner says that no decision on Alexander Albon's future with the team will be made until after the final Formula 1 race of 2020. Red Bull to delay decision on.
In economics, time preference (or time discounting,[1]delay discounting, temporal discounting,[2]long-term orientation[3]) is the current relative valuation placed on receiving a good or some cash at an earlier date compared with receiving it at a later date.[1]
Time preferences are captured mathematically in the discount function. The higher the time preference, the higher the discount placed on returns receivable or costs payable in the future.
One of the factors that may determine an individual's time preference is how long that individual has lived. An older individual may have a lower time preference (relative to what they had earlier in life) due to a higher income and to the fact that they have had more time to acquire durable commodities (such as a college education or a house).[4]
Examples[edit]
A practical example is if Jim and Bob go out for a drink and Jim has no money so Bob lends Jim $10. The next day Bob comes back to Jim, and Jim says, 'Bob, you can have $10 now, or at the end of the month when I get paid I will give you $15.' Bob's time preference would change depending on if he trusted Jim and how much he needs the money now, thinks he can wait, or would prefer to have $15 at the end of the month than $10 now. Present and expected needs, present and expected income affect the time preference.
Neoclassical views[edit]
In the neoclassical theory of interest due to Irving Fisher, the rate of time preference is usually taken as a parameter in an individual's utility function which captures the trade off between consumption today and consumption in the future, and is thus exogenous and subjective. It is also the underlying determinant of the real rate of interest. The rate of return on investment is generally seen as return on capital, with the real rate of interest equal to the marginal product of capital at any point in time. Arbitrage, in turn, implies that the return on capital is equalized with the interest rate on financial assets (adjusting for factors such as inflation and risk). Consumers, who are facing a choice between consumption and saving, respond to the difference between the market interest rate and their own subjective rate of time preference ('impatience') and increase or decrease their current consumption according to this difference. This changes the amount of funds available for investment and capital accumulation, as in for example the Ramsey growth model.
In the long run steady state, consumption's share in a person's income is constant which pins down the rate of interest as equal to the rate of time preference, with the marginal product of capital adjusting to ensure this equality holds. It is important to note that in this view, it is not that people discount the future because they can receive positive interest rates on their savings. Rather, the causality goes in the opposite direction; interest rates must be positive in order to induce impatient individuals to forgo current consumptions in favor of future.
Austrian School views[edit]
In his book Capital and Interest, the Austrian economist Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk built upon the time-preference ideas of Carl Menger, insisting that there is always a difference in value between present goods and future goods of equal quality, quantity, and form. Furthermore, the value of future goods diminishes as the length of time necessary for their completion increases.
Böhm-Bawerk cited three reasons for this difference in value. First of all, in a growing economy, the supply of goods will always be larger in the future than it is in the present. Secondly, people have a tendency to underestimate their future needs due to carelessness and shortsightedness. Finally, entrepreneurs would rather initiate production with goods presently available, instead of waiting for future goods and delaying production.
By contrast, George Reisman says that time preference arises because of the possibility of being less able (say through injury or the effects of aging) or totally unable (through substantial incapacitation or death) to enjoy the use of goods in the future.[5] The further into the future someone considers, the less likely it is that this someone will be able to enjoy the goods as much as they can be enjoyed now. The root of time-preference in Reisman's view is an internal risk premium that is specific to the owner of the goods, in contrast to an externalrisk premium that is demanded when the owner invests them in a production process or lends them to another. He then points out that the scarcity of capital combined with the uncertainties he raises, means that time preference is unavoidable and hence a minimum rate of return on that capital (such as in interest and normal profit) is always going to be required by suppliers of capital.
In Human Action (chapter 18), Ludwig von Mises discusses time inconsistency: that sooner-occurring future intervals are valued more highly than later-occurring future intervals.[6] This observation has been observed in behavioral economics.[citation needed]
Temporal discounting[edit]
Temporal discounting (also known as delay discounting, time discounting)[7] is the tendency of people to discount rewards as they approach a temporal horizon in the future or the past (i.e., become so distant in time that they cease to be valuable or to have additive effects). To put it another way, it is a tendency to give greater value to rewards as they move away from their temporal horizons and towards the 'now'. For instance, a nicotine deprived smoker may highly value a cigarette available any time in the next 6 hours but assign little or no value to a cigarette available in 6 months.[8]
Regarding terminology, from Frederick et al (2002):
We distinguish time discounting from time preference. We use the term time discounting broadly to encompass any reason for caring less about a future consequence, including factors that diminish the expected utility generated by a future consequence, such as uncertainty or changing tastes. We use the term time preference to refer, more specifically, to the preference for immediate utility over delayed utility.
This term is used in intertemporal economics, intertemporal choice, neurobiology of reward and decision making, microeconomics and recently neuroeconomics.[9] Traditional models of economics assumed that the discounting function is exponential in time leading to a monotonic decrease in preference with increased time delay; however, more recent neuroeconomic models suggest a hyperbolic discount function which can address the phenomenon of preference reversal.[10]
Assessing temporal discounting[edit]
Offered a choice of $100 today and $100 in one month, individuals will most likely choose the $100 now. However, should the question change to having $100 today, or $1,000 in one month, individuals will most likely choose the $1,000 in one month. The $100 can be conceptualized as a Smaller Sooner Reward (SSR), and the $1,000 can be conceptualized as a Larger Later Reward (LLR). Researchers who study temporal discounting are interested in the point in time in which an individual changes their preference for the SSR to the LLR, or vice versa. For example, although an individual may prefer $1,000 in one month over $100 now, they may switch their preference to the $100 if the delay to the $1,000 is increased to 60 months (5 years). This means that this individual values $1,000 after a delay of 60 months less than $100 now. The trick is to find the point in time in which the individual values the LLR and the SSR as being equivalent. That is known as the indifference point.[11] Preferences can be measured by asking people to make a series of choices between immediate and delayed payoffs, where the delay period and the payoff amounts are varied.
Origin of differences in time preference across countries[edit]
Oded Galor and Omer Ozak explore the roots of observed differences in time preference across nations.[12] They establish that pre-industrial agricultural characteristics that were favorable to higher return to agricultural investment triggered a process of selection, adaptation, and learning that brought about a higher prevalence of long-term orientation. These agricultural characteristics are associated with contemporary economic and human behavior such as technological adoption, education, saving, and smoking.
See also[edit]
- Hyperbolic discounting – A model of typical time preferences.
Notes[edit]
- ^ abFrederick, Shane; Loewenstein, George; O’donoghue, Ted (2002). 'Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review'(PDF). Journal of Economic Literature. 40 (2): 351–401. doi:10.1257/jel.40.2.351.
- ^Doyle, John R. (2013). 'Survey of time preference, delay discounting models'(PDF). Judgment and Decision Making. 8 (2): 116–135.
- ^Hofstede, Geert (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations. Sage publications.
- ^Bayer, Y. M.; Osher, Y. (2018). 'Time preference, executive functions, and ego-depletion: An exploratory study'. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics. 11 (3): 127–134. doi:10.1037/npe0000092.
- ^Reisman, George (1996). Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics(PDF). Ottawa: Jameson Books.
- ^MISES, L. V. Human Action. A Treatise on Economics. Scholar's Edition. Alburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. Pg. 480
- ^Doyle, John R. (2013). 'Survey of time preference, delay discounting models'(PDF). Judgment and Decision Making. 8 (2): 116–135. ISSN1930-2975.
- ^Bickel, W. K.; Odum, A. L.; Madden, G. J. (1999). 'Impulsivity and cigarette smoking: delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers'. Psychopharmacology. 146 (4): 447–454. doi:10.1007/PL00005490. ISSN0033-3158. PMID10550495.
- ^Takahashi T., Hadzibeganovic T., Cannas S. A., Makino T., Fukui H., Kitayama S. (2009). 'Cultural neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice'. Neuro Endocrinol. Lett. 30 (2): 185–91. CiteSeerX10.1.1.232.7650. PMID19675524.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- ^Green, Leonard; Myerson, Joel (2004). 'A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards'. Psychological Bulletin. 130 (5): 769–792. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.5.769. ISSN0033-2909. PMC1382186. PMID15367080.
- ^Odum, Amy L. (2011). 'Delay Discounting: I'm a k, You're a k'. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 96 (3): 427–439. doi:10.1901/jeab.2011.96-423. ISSN0022-5002. PMC3213005. PMID22084499.
- ^Galor, Oded; Özak, Ömer (2016). 'The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference'. American Economic Review. 106 (10): 3064–3103. doi:10.1257/aer.20150020. PMC5541952. PMID28781375.
Future Delayed
Source code:Lib/asyncio/futures.py,Lib/asyncio/base_futures.py
Future objects are used to bridge low-level callback-based codewith high-level async/await code.
Future Functions¶
asyncio.isfuture(obj)¶Return True if obj is either of:
an instance of
asyncio.Future,an instance of
asyncio.Task,a Future-like object with a
_asyncio_future_blockingattribute.
asyncio.ensure_future(obj, *, loop=None)¶Return:
obj argument as is, if obj is a
Future,aTask, or a Future-like object (isfuture()is used for the test.)a
Taskobject wrapping obj, if obj is acoroutine (iscoroutine()is used for the test);in this case the coroutine will be scheduled byensure_future().a
Taskobject that would await on obj, if obj is anawaitable (inspect.isawaitable()is used for the test.)
If obj is neither of the above a TypeError is raised.
Important
See also the create_task() function which is thepreferred way for creating new Tasks.
Changed in version 3.5.1: The function accepts any awaitable object.
asyncio.wrap_future(future, *, loop=None)¶
Wrap a concurrent.futures.Future object in aasyncio.Future object.
Future Object¶
asyncio.Future(*, loop=None)¶A Future represents an eventual result of an asynchronousoperation. Not thread-safe.
Future is an awaitable object. Coroutines can await onFuture objects until they either have a result or an exceptionset, or until they are cancelled.
Typically Futures are used to enable low-levelcallback-based code (e.g. in protocols implemented using asynciotransports)to interoperate with high-level async/await code.
The rule of thumb is to never expose Future objects in user-facingAPIs, and the recommended way to create a Future object is to callloop.create_future(). This way alternative event loopimplementations can inject their own optimized implementationsof a Future object.
Changed in version 3.7: Added support for the contextvars module.
result()¶Return the result of the Future.
If the Future is done and has a result set by theset_result() method, the result value is returned.
If the Future is done and has an exception set by theset_exception() method, this method raises the exception.
If the Future has been cancelled, this method raisesa CancelledError exception.
If the Future’s result isn’t yet available, this method raisesa InvalidStateError exception.
set_result(result)¶Mark the Future as done and set its result.
Raises a InvalidStateError error if the Future isalready done.
set_exception(exception)¶Mark the Future as done and set an exception.
Raises a InvalidStateError error if the Future isalready done.
done()¶Return True if the Future is done.
A Future is done if it was cancelled or if it has a resultor an exception set with set_result() orset_exception() calls.
cancelled()¶Return True if the Future was cancelled.
The method is usually used to check if a Future is notcancelled before setting a result or an exception for it:
add_done_callback(callback, *, context=None)¶Add a callback to be run when the Future is done.
The callback is called with the Future object as its onlyargument.
If the Future is already done when this method is called,the callback is scheduled with loop.call_soon().
An optional keyword-only context argument allows specifying acustom contextvars.Context for the callback to run in.The current context is used when no context is provided.
functools.partial() can be used to pass parametersto the callback, e.g.:
Changed in version 3.7: The context keyword-only parameter was added.See PEP 567 for more details.
remove_done_callback(callback)¶Future.delayed Flutter
Remove callback from the callbacks list.
Returns the number of callbacks removed, which is typically 1,unless a callback was added more than once.
cancel(msg=None)¶Cancel the Future and schedule callbacks.
If the Future is already done or cancelled, return False.Otherwise, change the Future’s state to cancelled,schedule the callbacks, and return True.
exception()¶Return the exception that was set on this Future.
The exception (or None if no exception was set) isreturned only if the Future is done.
If the Future has been cancelled, this method raises aCancelledError exception.
If the Future isn’t done yet, this method raises anInvalidStateError exception.
get_loop()¶Return the event loop the Future object is bound to.
New in version 3.7.
This example creates a Future object, creates and schedules anasynchronous Task to set result for the Future, and waits untilthe Future has a result:
Future.delayed Example
Important
Future Delay. Tense
The Future object was designed to mimicconcurrent.futures.Future. Key differences include:
Future Delay. Movies
unlike asyncio Futures,
concurrent.futures.Futureinstances cannot be awaited.asyncio.Future.result()andasyncio.Future.exception()do not accept the timeout argument.asyncio.Future.result()andasyncio.Future.exception()raise anInvalidStateErrorexception when the Future is notdone.Callbacks registered with
asyncio.Future.add_done_callback()are not called immediately. They are scheduled withloop.call_soon()instead.asyncio Future is not compatible with the
concurrent.futures.wait()andconcurrent.futures.as_completed()functions.asyncio.Future.cancel()accepts an optionalmsgargument,butconcurrent.futures.cancel()does not.