Nor would it proscribe 'warehousing.' See generally SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report, H. Likewise, market specialists would not be subject to a disclose-or-refrain requirement in the performance of their everyday 445 U.S. 222, 243 market functions. In each of these instances, trading is. The following is a list of Adventures in Odyssey radio episodes, albums, videos, books, and merchandise, including initial radio episodes from the series Family Portraits. 1 This is the pilot series, which aired in 1987 under the name Family Portraits. 2 Family Portraits 3 1987 4 1988 5 1989 6 1990 7 1991 8 1992 9 19 11 19 12.1 Hiatus 13 1997-19-19-2000. “The Ill-Gotten Deed” is episode #92 of the Adventures in Odyssey audio series. It was written and directed by Phil Lollar, and originally aired on November 4, 1989. User Review - Flag as inappropriate I am only interested in the Bucks branch, and find the book to be a wealth of valuable information. However, I do take exception with the unsourced statement on p.233 under Moses Doan that states about the man who shot him, Captain Robert Gibson - It is said that Gibson was not voluntarily one of the party, but was suspected of being implicated with the.
The fraction of tippers who tip the same day that they receive information is 46.5% for the original source, increasing to 92.1% in the fourth and higher links. This delay means that the period between when the tippee receives the information and the event date declines over time, from an average of 13.9 trading days in the first link to 9.1.
GREGORY, Chief Judge:
Gregory Aime was a successful franchise operator of several tax preparation businesses under the umbrella of JTH Tax, Inc. and SiempreTax+ LLC (together, 'Liberty Tax'). The relationship between franchisee and franchisor deteriorated, resulting in litigation that culminated in a bench trial before the district court. Aime largely prevailed and was awarded a significant sum of damages. Both parties appealed. This Court vacated a substantial portion of the damages award but upheld the judgment in Aime's favor. Upon remand, the district court recalculated damages based on our instructions. On Aime's motion, the district court subsequently amended its judgment, increasing the damages award based on purportedly new evidence. Now, once again, both parties appeal.
Aime argues the district court erred by not awarding him more, and Liberty Tax argues the district court erred by awarding him too much. In general, we are sympathetic to the district court's concerns about Liberty Tax's bad faith conduct. We find no error in the district court's denial of Aime's arguments for reinstatement of much of the original damages. But we do find error in the court's conclusion that Aime met the standard for relief based on newly discovered evidence and in the award of nominal damages. We affirm in part, reverse and vacate in part, and remand with instructions to recalculate damages in accordance with this opinion.
I.
For purposes of factual background, we assume familiarity with the facts laid out in our prior opinion, JTH Tax, Inc. v. Aime, 744 F. App'x 787, 789-91 (4th Cir. 2018) (JTH Tax I), and provide only a summary exposition here.
A.
Aime operated nine tax services franchises under agreements with Liberty Tax. Those agreements included the condition that Aime maintain an Electronic Filing Identification Number ('EFIN') from the IRS.
Liberty Tax agreed to purchase Aime's franchises back, and Aime agreed to apply for reinstatement of his EFIN. Liberty Tax also agreed to take charge of operating the franchises and pay for all associated expenses and liabilities, including rent and utilities. If Aime's EFIN was restored by May 8, 2016, the PSA provided that he 'shall have' the option to buy back the franchises—pursuant to a new purchase and sale agreement and subject only to Liberty Tax's 'standard sales and approval process.' If Aime successfully bought back the franchises, Liberty Tax would owe him any profits earned in the meantime. The PSA also authorized Liberty Tax to request that Aime work with his landlords to assign the leases for each franchise property to Liberty Tax, but such transfer was not immediate, and the leases initially remained in Aime's name.
Despite its obligations to Aime under the PSA, Liberty Tax immediately began to contemplate selling the franchises to another buyer. As the district court put it—making findings from the bench after trial—'the course of conduct of Liberty throughout the dispute and during the trial indicates that they never had any intention of recognizing Aime's right to repurchase the business.' Meanwhile, Aime attempted in earnest to restore his EFIN status, but it soon became apparent that he would be unable to do so by the May deadline. Nevertheless, Liberty Tax's CEO represented to Aime, through an employee, that Liberty Tax would extend the deadline for Aime's EFIN reinstatement to the end of the year. Aime represented his acceptance and continued operating under the apparent understanding that he had until the end of the year to buy back the franchises.
The parties' relationship soon deteriorated. Liberty Tax requested that Aime assign it the leases for the franchise properties, as provided for by the PSA, but the parties could not agree to terms for the assignment. At some point, Liberty Tax stopped paying its rent and utilities obligations. Eventually Aime changed the entry code used to access some of the properties, effectively denying Liberty Tax access. Liberty Tax sued in federal court, and Aime countersued. In September 2016, amidst the litigation, Aime received his new EFIN from the IRS.
B.
After a bench trial, the district court found that Liberty Tax breached the PSA first by failing to pay franchise expenses as required. Liberty Tax also breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further, the court gave effect to the disputed extension of the buyback deadline, finding that Liberty Tax had, in fact, extended the deadline to the end of the year. And because Aime's EFIN was restored in September, the district court found that he would have invoked his buyback option if not for Liberty Tax's breach. Therefore, in addition to owing Aime damages for the unpaid expenses, the court held that Liberty Tax owed lost profits damages. The court denied Aime's remaining claims—for anticipatory breach, fraud, and punitive damages and attorneys' fees—as covered by the breach of contract claim or as otherwise unavailable. The district court calculated the total damages as $2,736,896.17.
Both parties appealed. Liberty Tax challenged the district court's judgment in favor of Aime and certain evidentiary rulings, and Aime challenged the denial of his fraud and attorneys' fees claims. This Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Liberty Tax breached the PSA first such that Aime prevailed on his breach of contract claim. JTH Tax I, 744 F. App'x at 794. We also affirmed the denial of Aime's other claims. Id. at 793-94. However, we found error concerning the buyback extension deadline. Because the offer to extend the deadline came with no new consideration, the parties never reached an enforceable agreement. Id. at 791-93. And because Aime had not obtained a new EFIN by the May deadline, he could not be awarded damages based on the option to buyback the franchises. Id. at 794. Therefore, Aime was not entitled to lost profits, and we vacated that portion of the district court's award. Id. We remanded for recalculation of damages. Id.
Upon remand, the parties agreed that the breach of contract damages totaled $248,246.27—the amount of unpaid expenses and other liabilities. Aime argued further, however, that he was entitled to separate damages on his claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Aime reasoned that, because the district court found that Liberty Tax had no intention of honoring the PSA from the start, Liberty Tax effectively breached the good faith covenant at the very outset of the agreement. According to Aime, because that breach occurred at a time when it was still possible that he would become eligible to exercise his buyback option, lost profits were 'foreseeable' damages and he was entitled to the same damages previously awarded.
The district court awarded Aime the agreed-upon amount of damages on the breach of contract claim, but it denied Aime's argument for damages flowing from the breach of the implied covenant for a number of reasons. Lost profits damages were not 'reasonably certain' at the time of the breach, and Aime did not, in fact, subsequently meet the buyback deadline. Also, Aime's argument essentially positioned a breach of the covenant as an independent tort claim, which Virginia law prohibits—the claim is effectively a claim for breach of contract. However, finding the outcome 'troubling,' the district court did award Aime $5,000 in nominal damages to recognize that '[Liberty Tax] acted in bad faith throughout its negotiations with [Aime],' whereas '[Aime] acted in good faith during the period of the extension by continuing to pursue and ultimately obtain the EFIN.'
Aime filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration.
The district court denied Aime's motion for reconsideration seeking the original damages sum based on equitable principles. The court found the arguments procedurally barred—as they had not been raised in the course of litigation and conflicted with this Court's mandate—as well as substantively meritless. However, the district court granted Aime's motion to increase the judgment based on new evidence. It held that the damages would have been awarded as compensatory relief if they had been identified during trial, and that they were, in fact, newly discovered. Accordingly, the court amended the damages award upwards by $49,465.94.
Both parties now appeal the district court's post-remand rulings to this Court.
II.
Aime appeals from the district court's denial of his post-judgment motion for reconsideration. Liberty Tax appeals from the district court's grant of Aime's motion to amend the judgment based on newly discovered evidence. Liberty Tax also challenges the award of $5,000 in nominal damages on Aime's claim for breach of the duty of good faith.
We review a district court's decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020). We review conclusions of law regarding the availability and calculation of damages de novo, and we review any relevant factual findings for clear error. Simms v. United States,839 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 2016).
A.
Aime contends that the district court mistakenly believed its hands were tied as to potential remedies in the post-remand damages proceedings. The court erred, he reasons, when it concluded that disgorgement damages were unavailable. He urges us to find instead that disgorgement was the proper remedy for Liberty Tax's breach of the good faith duty, lest Liberty Tax be rewarded for its dishonest dealings. But, as unfortunate as the outcome may be for Aime, his theory fails on two separate bases.
First, after years of litigation, a bench trial, an appeal to this Court, and a damages proceeding upon remand, Aime raised disgorgement for the first time in a motion to reconsider a final judgment.
Aime protests that '[e]ven if [he] did not use the word' disgorgement 'earlier in the litigation,'
Second, Aime's argument for disgorgement damages is precluded by the mandate rule. The mandate rule is a 'more powerful version' of the law of the case doctrine. Invention Submissions Corp. v. Dudas,413 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2005). It requires a lower court to faithfully apply the mandate of a higher court, which is controlling as to all matters within its scope. Doe v. Chao,511 F.3d 461, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2007). The rule has two dimensions: 'First, `any issue conclusively decided by this court on the first appeal is not remanded,' and second, `any issue that could have been but was not raised on appeal is waived and thus not remanded.' Id. (quoting United States v. Husband,312 F.3d 247, 250-51 (7th Cir. 2002)). Here, both aspects of the mandate rule preclude Aime's argument for disgorgement.
Aime's disgorgement theory was as follows: Liberty Tax breached the contract by acting in bad faith immediately after its consummation, and Aime was prevented from suing at that point only by Liberty Tax's deception, entitling him to disgorgement of Liberty Tax's subsequent ill-gotten profits from the franchises. But Aime's only contractual right to past profits from the franchises was an option, contingent on the necessary condition that Aime first satisfy his obligation to regain a valid EFIN by the May deadline. Aime did not do so, and this Court held that the buyback deadline was not validly extended, meaning that 'Aime wasn't entitled to damages resulting from Liberty Tax's refusal to sell back his former franchises.' See JTH Tax I, 744 F. App'x at 791-94. Aime could never have effected the option, so Liberty Tax's gains from the stores were not, in fact, 'ill-gotten.' Thus, because Aime's argument for disgorgement is based on 'Liberty Tax's refusal to sell back his former franchises,' it contradicts this Court's prior mandate. See id.
Moreover, as discussed above, Aime failed to raise his disgorgement argument to the district court during the litigation and to this Court on his previous appeal. The mandate rule 'forecloses litigation of issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived, for example because they were not raised in the district court.' Volvo Trademark Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co.,510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007). Consequently, Aime's argument is procedurally barred by the mandate rule as well. See id. Aime responds that disgorgement did not 'become relevant until remand' because previously, 'Aime was awarded his full lost profits.' But this argument is self-defeating. It amounts to a concession that Aime raised a new legal theory to obtain the same damages that the district court and this Court denied him on his previous theory. '[U]nder the mandate rule[,] a remand proceeding is not the occasion for raising new arguments or legal theories.' Id.
The district court did not err in concluding that the Rule 59(e) standard and the mandate rule precluded Aime's disgorgement theory.
B.
Next, Liberty Tax argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting Aime's motion to increase the damages award based on newly discovered evidence. It contends that Aime could have discovered the underlying evidence at issue during the litigation, meaning Rule 59(e)'s standard was not satisfied.
Where a motion for reconsideration is based on purportedly newly discovered evidence, the evidence must not have been discoverable prior to judgment by the exercise of reasonable due diligence. Boryan v. United States,884 F.2d 767, 771 (4th Cir. 1989). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence meets this requirement. See id.; Pac. Ins., 148 F.3d at 403 ('[T]he party `must produce a legitimate justification for not presenting the evidence during the earlier proceeding.') (quoting Small v. Hunt,98 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Here, upon remand, the parties stipulated to the damages that flowed from Liberty Tax's breach of contract, including costs of unpaid rent. Then, in his post-judgment motion, Aime raised a July 2018 state court judgment against him for unpaid rent on one of the franchise leases—the 'Burnside property'—to justify an increase of the damages award. Aime submitted a declaration regarding his initial discovery of the judgment in 2019, stating that he 'could not have included the . . . judgment in my damage claim at trial in this case because it did not exist at the time.' Relying solely on Aime's declaration, the district court granted the motion to amend the judgment. That decision amounts to error.
As the district court correctly noted, the judgment itself was not the 'newly discovered evidence' at issue, given that it did not exist prior to the trial in January 2017. Rather, the question was whether the underlying unpaid rent qualified as newly discovered evidence that was not previously available to Aime during the litigation. However, even after making this correct observation, the district court's analysis nevertheless considered only the judgment itself. It found that Aime met his burden under Rule 59(e) by submitting in his declaration 'that he only discovered the default judgment entered against him on March 30, 2019.' But that statement does not provide any 'legitimate justification' for not discovering and presenting the evidence of the unpaid rent during the litigation. See Pac. Ins., 148 F.3d at 403. Indeed, the declaration attests only to discovery of the judgment and makes no reference to Aime's knowledge of—or attempts at discovering—evidence of the underlying unpaid rent. Therefore, the district court erred by concluding that Aime had met his burden to show that the evidence qualified as newly discovered. See id.; Boryan, 884 F.2d at 771.
On appeal, Aime argues, effectively, that this error was harmless. He contends that he did, in fact, exercise due diligence, and the unpaid rent on the Burnside property was not discoverable because Liberty Tax failed to disclose it. Aime cites only one example of an affirmative act constituting his reasonable due diligence: a discovery request that 'Liberty Tax produce all documents regarding rent at the stores for 2016,' to which Liberty never produced any documents in response.
This single request is an insufficient showing of due diligence to satisfy Rule 59(e)'s standard as an 'extraordinary' remedy. Aime was aware of signs that Liberty Tax was not paying rent. See Boryan, 884 F.2d at 772 (affirming denial of Rule 59(e) motion where 'sufficient indicia of the [evidence at issue] existed . . . such that it could have been discovered with due diligence prior to judgment'). One of Aime's allegations from the outset of the litigation was Liberty Tax's general failure to pay rent on the franchise properties as promised. Further, Liberty Tax points to a June 2016 state court action Aime filed regarding their dispute. In that complaint, Aime alleged 'upon information and belief' that Liberty Tax was not paying rent on the Burnside property specifically. Thus, Aime believed rent was not being paid on the Burnside Property long before he received the default judgment in March 2019, the only fact attested to in his Rule 59(e) declaration.
Yet despite this awareness, Aime apparently did not use the tools of discovery to challenge Liberty Tax's non-responsiveness.
In sum, in the declaration and now on appeal, Aime does not show he exercised reasonable due diligence during the three years of litigation to discover and present evidence of unpaid rent on the Burnside property. Therefore, the district court erred by granting Aime's Rule 59(e) motion to increase the judgment.
C.
Finally, Liberty Tax challenges the district court's award of $5,000 in nominal damages on Aime's breach of the implied covenant of good faith claim.
After trial, the district court entered judgment for Aime on two counts: 'Count 1' for breach of contract and 'Count 2' for breach of the implied covenant. The court then awarded Aime compensatory damages without distinguishing between the two separate counts. On appeal, this Court vacated the lost profits portion of the award and remanded for recalculation. Then, upon remand, Aime emphasized that he obtained a successful judgment on these two separate counts. He argued that the lost profits damages vacated by this Court were linked to Count 1, breach of contract, but that he remained entitled to the same damages via Count 2, breach of the implied covenant. The district court rejected Aime's argument, but found the outcome 'troubling,' given Liberty Tax's bad faith conduct throughout its dealings with Aime. Therefore, the district court awarded Aime $5,000 in nominal damages on his claim for breach of the good faith duty. While sympathetic to the district court's concerns about rewarding Liberty Tax's deception in this case, we find error in the award of separate damages to remedy the breach of good faith.
As the district court correctly noted, Virginia law does not recognize an independent cause of action based on the implied covenant; rather, a breach of the duty of good faith constitutes a breach of contract and therefore gives rise only to a breach of contract claim. See Charles E. Brauer Co. v. NationsBank of Va., N.A.,466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Va. 1996).
Here, Aime's purportedly separate claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant were effectively one and the same. See Charles E. Brauer Co., 466 S.E.2d at 385. Therefore, nominal damages were unavailable because Aime was awarded compensatory damages to remedy Liberty Tax's breach of contract, regardless of the finding that Liberty Tax also breached the contract by breaching the implied covenant. See Kerns, 818 S.E.2d at 785-86. The district court erred by awarding an additional $5,000 as nominal damages.
III.
In sum, we affirm the district court's denial of Aime's motion for reconsideration of the judgment seeking disgorgement damages, and we reverse the district court's grant of Aime's motion to amend the judgment upwards based on newly discovered evidence and its award of nominal damages to remedy Liberty Tax's breach of the implied covenant. Accordingly, we vacate the post-judgment increase in damages by $49,465.94 and the award of $5,000 in nominal damages from the damages sum and remand for recalculation.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
| ٱلهُمَزَة Al-Humazah The Gossipmonger | |
|---|---|
| Classification | Meccan |
| Other names | The Traducer, The Slanderer, The Backbiter |
| Position | Juzʼ 30 |
| No. of verses | 9 |
| No. of words | 33 |
| No. of letters | 133 |
Quran 105 → | |
| Quran |
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al-Humazah (Arabic: الهمزة, 'The Backbiter'[1] 'The Slanderer' [2] 'The Scorner' [3]) is the 104th chapter (sūrah) of the Qur'an, with 9 verses (āyāt).
- [4] Woe to every backbiter, slanderer,
- who amasses wealth ˹greedily˺ and counts it ˹repeatedly˺,
- thinking that their wealth will make them immortal!
- Not at all! Such a person will certainly be tossed into the Crusher.
- And what will make you realize what the Crusher is?
- ˹It is˺ Allah’s kindled Fire,
- which rages over the hearts.
- It will be sealed over them,
- ˹tightly secured˺ with long braces.[5]
The Surah takes its name from the word humazah occurring in the first verse. The Main statement in this Surah [Humazah] is the Consequences of man in loss. It condemns those who slander others, whether by speech or action, and imagine that their own wealth will keep them immune from death, and describes the doom of Hell which awaits them.
Regarding the timing and contextual background of the supposed revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), it is an earlier 'Meccan surah', which means it is believed to have been revealed in Mecca, instead of later in Medina.
Summary[edit]
- 1-4 Woes pronounced on slanderers and backbiters
- 5-9Al Hutama described [6]
Text and meaning[edit]
Text and transliteration[edit]
- Hafs from Aasim ibn Abi al-Najud
92 The Ill-gotten Deed Book
بِسْمِ ٱللَّهِ ٱلرَّحْمَٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ
Bismi l-lāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm(i)
وَيْلٌ لِّكُلِّ هُمَزَةٍ لُّمَزَةٍ
1Waylu l-likulli humazati l-lumazah(tin)
ٱلَّذِى جَمَعَ مَالًا وَعَدَّدَهُۥ
2’al ladhī jama‘a māla w-wa‘addadah(ū)
يَحْسَبُ أَنَّ مَالَهُۥٓ أَخْلَدَهُۥ
3Yaḥsabu ’anna mālahū ’akhladah(ū)
كَلَّاصلےلَيُنۢبَذَنَّ فِى ٱلْحُطَمَةِ
4Kallā, layunbadhanna fi l-ḥuṭamah(ti)
وَمَآ أَدْرَىٰكَ مَا ٱلْحُطَمَةُ
5Wamā ’adrāka ma l-ḥuṭamah(tu)
نَارُ ٱللَّهِ ٱلْمُوقَدَةُ
6Nāru l-lāhi l-mūqadah(tu)
ٱلَّتِى تَطَّلِعُ عَلَى ٱلْأَفْـِٔدَةِ
7’al latī taṭṭali‘u ‘ala l-’af’idah(ti)
إِنَّهَا عَلَيْهِم مُّؤْصَدَةٌ
8’innahā ‘alayhi m-mu’ṣadah(tun)
فِى عَمَدٍ مُّمَدَّدَةٍۭ
9Fī ‘amadi m-mumaddadah(tin)
- Warsh from Nafiʽ al-Madani
بِسۡمِ اِ۬للَّهِ اِ۬لرَّحۡمَٰنِ اِ۬لرَّحِيمِص
Bismi l-lāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm(i)
وَيۡلٌ لِّكُلِّ هُمَزَةٍ لُّمَزَةٍ
1Waylu l-likulli humazati l-lumazah(tin)
اِ۬لَّذِے جَمَعَ مَالًا وَعَدَّدَهُۥ
2’al ladhī jama‘a māla w-wa‘addadah(ū)
يَحۡسِبُ أَنَّ مَالَهُۥٓ أَخۡلَدَهُۥ
3Yaḥsibu ’anna mālahū ’akhladah(ū)
كَلَّاصلَيُنۢبَذَنَّ فِے اِ۬لۡحُطَمَةِص
4Kallā, layunbadhanna fi l-ḥuṭamah(ti)
وَمَآ أَدۡرٜيٰكَ مَا اَ۬لۡحُطَمَةُص
5Wamā ’adrāka ma l-ḥuṭamah(tu)
نَارُ اَ۬للَّهِ اِ۬لۡمُوقَدَةُ
6Nāru l-lāhi l-mūqadah(tu)
اَ۬لَّتِى تَطَّلِعُ عَلَے اَ۬لَافۡـِٔدَةِص
7’al latī taṭṭali‘u ‘ala laf’idah(ti)
إِنَّهَا عَلَيۡهِم مُّوصَدَةٌ
8’innahā ‘alayhi m-mūṣadah(tun)
فِے عَمَدٍ مُّمَدَّدَةٍۭص
9Fī ‘amadi m-mumaddadah(tin)
Meanings[edit]
1Woe to every slanderer and backbiter.
2Who has gathered wealth and counted it,
3He thinks that his wealth will make him last forever!
4Nay! Verily, he will be thrown into the crushing Fire
5And what will make you know what the crushing Fire is?
6The fire of Allah, kindled,
7Which leaps up over the hearts,
8Verily, it shall be closed in on them,
9In pillars stretched forth (i.e. they will be punished in the Fire with pillars, etc.).
Translation:Noble Quran,[7] 1999
1Woe to every scorner and mocker
2Who collects wealth and [continuously] counts it.
3He thinks that his wealth will make him immortal.
4No! He will surely be thrown into the Crusher.
5And what can make you know what is the Crusher?
6It is the fire of Allāh, [eternally] fueled,
7Which mounts directed at the hearts.
8Indeed, Hellfire will be closed down upon them
9In extended columns.
Translation:Saheeh International,[8] 1997
1Woe to every (kind of) scandal-monger and-backbiter,
2Who pileth up wealth and layeth it by,
3Thinking that his wealth would make him last for ever!
4By no means! He will be sure to be thrown into That which Breaks to Pieces,
5And what will explain to thee That which Breaks to Pieces?
6(It is) the Fire of (the Wrath of) Allah kindled (to a blaze),
7The which doth mount (Right) to the Hearts:
8It shall be made into a vault over them,
9In columns outstretched.
Translation:Yusuf Ali,[9] 1934
1Woe unto every slandering traducer,
2Who hath gathered wealth (of this world) and arranged it.
3He thinketh that his wealth will render him immortal.
4Nay, but verily he will be flung to the Consuming One.
5Ah, what will convey unto thee what the Consuming One is!
6(It is) the fire of Allah, kindled,
7Which leapeth up over the hearts (of men).
8Lo! it is closed in on them
9In outstretched columns.
Translation:Pickthall,[10] 1930
Overview[edit]
In the phrase 'slandering traducer' (Arabic: humaza lumaza), according to Ibn Kathir, the first word refers to slandering by speech, and the second to slander by action (though he also quotes Mujahid as saying the opposite: 'Al-Humazah is with the hand and the eye, and Al-Lumazah is with the tongue.') The 'fire ... which leapeth over the hearts' is sometimes interpreted as starting below and rising: according to Ibn Kathir, Muhammad bin Ka`b said that 'it (the Fire) will devour every part of his body until it reaches his heart and comes to the level of his throat, then it will return to his body.' The 'columns' described in the final verse are interpreted as columns of fire by some authorities (e.g. As-Sudd), as in the translation above, but as literal pillars of iron by some others (e.g. Al-Awfi).
Surah Humazah tells how bad mankind can get into loss, and this is why some scholars state that there is no severer description given of hell in the Quran than the description given in this surah. Many severe and harsh descriptions of hell are mentioned in this surah, especially when Allah says about hell what He has not said in other Surahs: “Naarullah” ((the) Fire (of) Allah!).
In other surahs, Allah says “Naaru Jahannam” (Fire of Hell) etc. But when the fire is attributed to GOD, it's more than that, it's a fire lit by Allah Himself for those who opposed Him.
92 The Ill-gotten Deed Cast
This is the last surah in the Quran which discusses the Akhirah (after life), and the surahs after this do not discuss the Akhirah afterlife again.
92 The Ill-gotten Deeds
Theme and subject matter[edit]
In it some of the evils prevalent among the materialistic hoarders of wealth in the pre-Islamic days have been condemned. Every Arab knew that these vices, actually existed in their society; they regarded them as evils and nobody thought they were good. After calling attention to this kind of ugly character, the ultimate end in the Hereafter of the people having this kind of character has been stated. Both these things (i.e. the character and his fate in the Hereafter) have been depicted in a way which makes the listener automatically reach the conclusion that such a man fitly deserves to meet such an end. And since in the world, people of such character do not suffer any punishment, but seem to be thriving instead, the occurrence of the Hereafter becomes absolutely inevitable.
The name of the Surah is derived from the verb 'humaza' occurring in the first verse. Together with 'lumaza' which follows it the theme of the verse is set as involving the condemnation of mockery. This mockery is themed on the actions of the unbelievers of the time towards the early Muslim believers. Humaza meaning the mockery coming from the hands and eye, and lumaza the mockery from the tongue; refers in a much broader way to mockery done in all manner of ways great or small, obvious or veiled, loud or soft and so on. The construct encompasses all forms of mockery designed to belittle the other and ingratiate the self. This can be related as the great sin of Iblis (Satan) as when he mocks God's creation of Adam in describing His creation as being mere mud and unworthy of any respect.
It then deals in the second verse with the accumulation of money and wealth. In these verses it is not the mere honest earning of wealth that is meant, it is the completely inconsiderate accumulation of wealth without any concern given to its origin or means of acquisition. No regard is given to whether the wealth belongs properly to someone else, or whether any others have a share in it. Whether it comes from legitimate or illegal business. In effect it is the blind accumulation of wealth for wealth's sake to enrich only the avarice of the ones guilty of this sin. This is furthered by the fact that those focused on this behaviour continuously dwell upon the amount of their ill gotten hoard and take pleasure in stacking it up and so on.
The third verse amplifies the sin of heedless accumulation of wealth by stating that those with such attitudes believe it will protect them and sustain them in this world and also in the hereafter. That the wealth will buy them protection and sustenance in perpetuity. The second and third verses are implicitly cited as the cause of the increased self-importance, pride and haughtiness of those who mock others.
If this Surah is read in the sequence of the Surahs beginning with al-Zalzala, one can fully well understand how the fundamental beliefs of Islam and its teachings were impressed on the peoples minds in the earliest stage in Makkah. In Surah Az-Zilzal, it was said that in the Hereafter man's full record will be placed before him and not an atom's weight of good or evil done by him in the world will have been left unrecorded. In Surah Al-Adiyatt, attention was drawn to the plunder and loot, bloodshed and vandalism, prevailing in Arabia before Islam; then making the people realize, that the way the powers given by God were being abused, was indeed an expression of sheer ingratitude to Him, they were told that the matter would not end up in the world, but in the second life after death not only their deeds but their intentions and motives too would be examined, and their Lord fully well knows which of them deserves what reward or punishment. In Surah Al-Qaria after depicting Resurrection the people were warned that in the Hereafter a man's good or evil end will be dependent on whether the scale of his good deeds was heavier, or the scale of his evil deeds was heavier:In Surah At-Takathur the people were taken to task for the materialistic mentality because of which they remained occupied in seeking increase in worldly benefits, pleasures, comforts and position, and in vying with one another for abundance of everything until death overtook them. Then, warning them of the evil consequences of their heedlessness, they were told that the world was not an open table of food for then to pick and choose whatever they pleased, but for every single blessing that they were enjoying in the world, they would have to render an account to their Lord and Sustainer as to how they obtained it and how they used it. In Surah Al-Asr it was declared that each member, each group and each community of mankind, even the entire world of humanity, was in manifest loss, if its members were devoid of Faith and righteous deeds and of the practice of exhorting others to truth and patience. Immediately after this comes Surah Al-Humazah in which after presenting a specimen of leadership of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, the people have been asked the question: 'What should such a character deserve if not loss and perdition?'
References[edit]
- ^M.A.S. Abdel-HaleemThe Qur'an: a New Translation, 2004 Oxford University Press (Oxford World's Classics Hardcovers Series).
- ^Sam GerransThe Quran: A Complete Revelation, 2016
- ^Saheeh InternationalTHE QUR'AN (1997)
- ^Arabic script in Unicode symbol for a Quran verse, U+06DD, page 3, Proposal for additional Unicode characters
- ^Mustafa Khattab translation (2015)
- ^Wherry, Elwood Morris (1896). A Complete Index to Sale's Text, Preliminary Discourse, and Notes. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co.This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^'quran.com, al-Humazah (104), Muhsin Khan'.
- ^'quran.com, al-Humazah (104), Saheeh International'.
- ^'quran.com, al-Humazah (104), Yusuf Ali'.
- ^'quran.com, al-Humazah (104), Pikhtall'.
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